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Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act
Patricia H. Chicolne"
I. LeoisLATw BACKGROUND
Effective August 15, 1995, the Louisiana Legislature adopted the Louisiana
Oil Well Lien Act,' a dramatic revision of the state's oil, gas and water well
privilege.2 Among other results, the new legislation provides a statute that
conforms with modem oil and gas operations and Louisiana conservation laws,
and, as well, recognizes the effect of the varying working interests participating
in the development of oil and gas properties.
A. Pre-Legislative Process
The legislative process that produced the new Act did not begin on the floor
of the Louisiana House or Senate. Instead, the new Act began, like much
Louisiana legislation, at the instance of the Louisiana Law Institute.
The Louisiana Law Institute is an "official advisory law revision commis-
sion, law reform agency and legal research agency of the State of Louisiana" that
is charged with the task of continuously revising the laws of the state.3
Essentially, every section of the Civil Code and the Revised Statutes is
periodically reviewed and, if necessary, amendments or revisions are recom-
mended to the Louisiana Legislature by the Law Institute.
For purposes of drafting and proposing new legislation, the Law Institute
works through its Council, which is an approximate fifty-sixty person group that
meets monthly to review proposed legislation. This group is composed of members
of the legislature, judiciary, trial attorneys, office practitioners, and law school
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1. La. R.S. 9:4861-9:4873 (Supp. 1997) (1995 La. Acts No. 962).
2. Although the new legislation was affectionately referred to by its drafters as "LOWLA,"
the statute will be referred to herein as the "new Act" or the "revised Act."
3. La. R.S. 24:201 (1989). Section 251 of Chapter 24 specifically charges the Institute with
the "continuous revision" of the Louisiana Revised Statutes.
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faculty. However, the Council itself does not devise the initial revisions. Instead,
smaller committees are appointed, with committee members being selected based
upon their unique familiarity with a particular area of the law. It is this committee
that drafts the initial proposed legislation, which, ultimately, is reviewed by the
Law Institute Council. If the Council deems it appropriate (and, typically,
following its own revisions as to form and substance), it will recommend the
proposed legislation to the Louisiana Legislature through a House or Senate
sponsor.'
The LOWLA Committee was composed of six attorneys, who acted as a
Subcommittee of the Institute's Security Devices Committee. Not coincidentally,
the subcommittee was representative of the oil and gas industry: some of the
committee's representatives represented the lessee's or operator's interest, while
others represented the interests of service and supply companies or financial
institutions.
B. Passage by the Legislature
The revised Act was passed by the Louisiana Legislature in June 1995, which
finalized three years of work by the LOWLA Subcommittee toward developing a
statute that recognizes and, hopefully, will correct certain inequities brought about
by prior oil and gas lien law. In addition, the new Act generally updates the prior
statute to be compatible with the ever changing character of oil and gas operations
and ownership. Following the Law Institute Council's review and revision at its
December 1994 meeting, the final version of the new Act was passed by both the
Louisiana Senate and House without further revision. As indicated above, the new
legislation, as Act 962 of 1995, became effective August 15, 1995.5
11. THE NEW ACr
A. Format
The statutes that preceded the current legislation have commonly been referred
to, by published title and common usage, as oil and gas "lien" laws, notwithstand-
ing that the term "privilege" is the more correct Louisiana terminology for the
security interest created thereunder. Regardless, the trend continues as the current
legislation has been referred to in the legislative text as the Louisiana Oil Well Lien
Act, despite the fact that the text of the new Act refers to a "privilege." 6
Despite that similarity, however, those familiar with the prior Oil, Gas and
Water Wells lien statute7 will notice that the format of the new Act is vastly
4. Patricia H. Chicoine, LOWLA: Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act . Recent Revisions, 43d
Institute on Mineral Law 2 (1996).
5. it
6. La. R.S. 9:4861-4873 (Supp. 1997).
7. La. R.S. 9:4861-9:4867 (1991), replaced by 1995 La. Acts No. 962.
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different from the earlier legislation. The new structure conforms to recent
dictates of the Louisiana Law Institute and, in that regard, closely resembles the
Louisiana Private Works Act.8 In particular, as is the trend in modem statutory
draftsmanship, the new Act includes a "Definitions" section to assist in the
proper understanding of the new statute.9 Further, where the prior statute
utilized a more narrative form in describing the scope and extent of the privilege,
the new Act more often makes use of subsections and lists, which more readily
draw the reader's eye to the particular provisions.
B. Overview of Significant Changes from Prior Law
The new Act contains many revisions to prior statutory language; however,
the significant changes were made in four general conceptual areas of the statute.
First, an attempt was made to keep the activities that give rise to the lien closer
to the location of the actual oil and gas operations. For example, claims by
furnishers of furnishers and suppliers of suppliers' are now limited unless such
claimants fall within the statute's definition of "contractor ' " and their work is
performed or their supplies are furnished to the "well site" as defined in the Act.'
Second, the property that is subject to the lien has been expanded under
certain circumstances and made more restrictive in others. The liability of a non-
participating working interest owner in unit operations is now limited to his
operating interest (and other described property) located within the unit upon
which the operations giving rise to the lien occur.13 The participating lessee,
however, enjoys no such limitation. Also, in response to the outcry of rig
owners and equipment and supply companies, the lien created by the statute only
attaches to a rig located on a well site if it is owned by the operator or by a
contractor whose actions gave rise to that lien. The new Act, in effect, overrules
the results reached by the courts in Ogden Oil Co. v. Servco 4 and Ogden Oil
Co. v. Venture Oil Corp.'5 In fairness to the Ogden courts, however, their
decisions appear to have been correct interpretations of Louisiana law as it stood
in the years the decisions were rendered.'
8. La. R.S. 9:4801-4855 (1991 and Supp. 1997).
9. La. R.S. 9:4861(1)-(12) (Supp. 1997).
10. That is. those who furnish or supply materials or equipment, often from a remote site, to
those who are the ultimate furnishers and suppliers of materials and equipment to the actual well site.
11. La. R.S. 9:4861(10) (Supp. 1997).
12. La. R.S. 9:4861(12) (Supp. 1997).
13. La. R.S. 9:4863(B) (Supp. 1997).
14. 611 F. Supp. 572 (M.D. La. 1985) (privilege attached to workover rig moved to well site
three months after lien claimant last supplied materials to such site).
15. 490 So. 2d 725 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986) (privilege filed by unpaid workover rig owner
attached to workover rig owned by contractor subsequently retained to provide services to same well).
16. Statutes in place during the years affected by the Ogden courts stated that the claimant had
"a privilege ... on all drilling rigs, standard rigs ... attached or located on the lease." See, e.g., La.
R.S.9:4861(A) (1991).
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The third substantive area of change deals with the requirement of notice.
Notice provisions were included in an effort to reduce the number of instances
where operators and contractors have to pay twice for services rendered in oil
and gas operations. Under the new Act, a claimant is required to give the
operator notice within 180 days of the last service rendered, or else suffer the
loss of lien rights as to all property, except under certain limited and specified
conditions.'
The fourth conceptual area of change focuses upon the time the privilege
will be extinguished. Previously, the privilege was extinguished as to all parties
if a statement of privilege was not filed before 180 days from the date of last
service or provision.' 8 Under the new Act, however, the privilege contin-
ues--even absent filing a statement of privilege-between those in direct privity
or where a direct obligation is otherwise established between the parties.'9 This
result is consistent with established Louisiana law stating that no privilege shall
be created by contract between parties absent a statutory basis therefor.
C. Structure and Analysis of the 1995 Revision to the Louisiana Oil Well
Lien Act
1. Defining the Scope and Extent of the Privilege (Section 9:4861)
The definitional section of the new Act2' is essential to a proper under-
standing of the statute's scope and application; in fact, the definitions, in most
respects, define and limit the rights granted under the statute. Under prior lien
statutes, terms were not defined; thus, persons or entities seeking the benefits of
the law were forced to rely upon general industry usage and to hope that the
courts' interpretations would be agreeable. In contrast, all of the new Act's
sections following the definitions are totally dependent upon a clear understand-
ing of the distinct definitions; thus, it is anticipated that practitioners will be
constantly referring to the definitions as the further provisions of the new Act are
applied. In an effort to emphasize the importance of the definitional section
toward understanding the new Act's procedural requirements and enforcement,
the next several pages of this article are dedicated to restating and analyzing the
definitions.
17. La. R.S. 9:4867 (Supp. 1997).
18. See La. R.S. 9:4862 (1991) pursuant to 1986 La. Acts No. 191; see also Compadres Inc.
v. Johnson Oil & Gas Corp., 547 So. 2d 382, 387 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989); Hawn Tool Co. v. Crystal
Oil Co., 514 So. 2d 636, 638 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); Genina Marine Serv., Inc. v. ARCO Oil &
Gas Co., 499 So. 2d 257, 261 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
19. La. R.S. 9:4865 (Supp. 1997) limits cessation of the privilege to "third persons," defined
at La. R.S. 9:4861(11) (Supp. 1997).
20. Blasingame v. Anderson, 236 La. 505, 519. 108 So. 2d 105, 110 (La. 1959); Capillon v.
Chambliss, 211 La. 1, 15, 29 So. 2d 171, 175 (La. 1946).
21. La. R.S. 9:4861(1)-(12) (Supp. 1997).
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a. Claimant.
Under the new Act, a "claimant" is defined as "a person who is owed an
obligation secured by the privilege established."' This definition eliminates the
former distinction between alaborer and those providing materials or furnishing
services in connection with the drilling or operation of a well.Y Because all
privileges now rank equally (except for the contractor's privilege, which is
inferior in rank to the privilege granted to the contractor's subcontractors),' the
distinction between laborers and suppliers or fumishers of materials and services
is no longer necessary.
b. Hydrocarbons
"Hydrocarbons" are defined in the new Act to include not only "oil and gas
occurring naturally in the earth," but also "any" other valuable liquid or gaseous
substance found and produced in association with them.' This definition is
likely to be well accepted in the industry and should pose no significant
departure from past usage or interpretation.
c. Well
Under the definition of "well," 6 the privilege is now limited to operations
essentially associated with oil or gas wells. It includes, however, operations
related to wells drilled for injection and disposal purposes, provided such
operations are associated with the exploration and production of hydrocarbons.
In contrast to prior statutes, the drilling of water wells has been excluded
(notwithstanding that the 1996 edition of the Louisiana Civil Code still entitles
the new Act "Oil, Gas and Water Wells"27), except those drilled for use in the
operation of a well intended to explore for oil and gas. The driller of a water
well, however, still has a lien remedy under the Louisiana Private Works Act.28
d. Operations
The definition of "operations" has been drafted broadly and includes all
typical well site activities: drilling, completing, testing, producing and
reworking.29 Work associated with the abandonment of wells is specifically
22. La. R.S. 9:4861(1) (Supp. 1997).
23. La. R.S. 9:4861 (1991).
24. La. R.S. 9:4870(A) (Supp. 1997).
25. La. R.S. 9:4861(2) (Supp. 1997).
26. La. R.S. 9:4861(3) (Supp. 1997).
27. Louisiana Civil Code 1073 (Yiannopoulos ed., 1996).
28. La. R.S. 9:4801-4855 (1991 and Supp. 1997).
29. La. R.S. 9:4861(4)(a) (Supp. 1997).
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included'in the definition of "operations," as is work associated with the
treatment or disposal of substances produced from the well or associated with
secondary and tertiary production methods.30
In a departure from the prior statute," however, (and in contrast to the
mineral lien law of at least one other oil and gas producing state32) "operations"
do not include activities associated with the transportation, handling, processing
or treating of production (either oil or gas) after it leaves the leasehold tanks or
the transmission lines for transportation away from the well site. 3 Further,
although "well site" is not necessarily limited to the physical location of the
well on which the work giving rise to the privilege is conducted, the new Act
attempts to limit the scope of the privilege to persons who clearly provide work
associated with the drilling or production of the well. The transportation and
handling of hydrocarbons beyond the well site is beyond the scope of the
statute's purview. Again, remedies under the Louisiana Private Works Act
35
should be available to such transporters and handlers.
Likewise, under the new Act, work associated with the operation or
construction of pipelines has been eliminated. The new statute returns the law to
the result reached in McGee v. Missouri Valley Dredging Co. 6 in which a
surveyor who surveyed a river crossing for the construction of two natural
gas transmission pipelines was held not to have a privilege under the prior
law.
Arguably, a significant change from prior law is the requirement that the
work giving rise to the privilege be physically conducted "on a well site."'"
Claimants who perform work away from the well site or deliver goods and
services to locations remote from the well site may not be afforded the
protection of this statute. This approach, perhaps, brings full circle the intent of
drafters of the first amendment to the original oil well lien statute when, in 1928,
the scope of the law was expanded to include operations and drilling on the well
site. 38 Consistent with prior law, operations need not result in a producing
well."9
30. Id
31. La. R.S. 9:4861 (1991).
32. The applicable Texas statute includes the operation, maintenance and repair of an oil or gas
pipeline in the definition of "mineral activities." Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 56.001(1) (West 1995).
Likewise, a pipeline may be the subject of the lien in Texas. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 56.003(a)(2)
(West 1995).
33. La. R.S. 9:4861(4)(b) (Supp. 1997).
34. La. R.S. 9:4861(12) (Supp. 1997).
35. La. R.S. 9:4801-4855 (1991 and Supp. 1997).
36. 182 So. 2d 764 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1966).
37. La. R.S. 9:4861(4)(a) (Supp. 1997).
38. 1928 La. Acts No. 171.
39. See Thomas H. Harrell, The Oil and Gas Well Lien Statute-Annotated. 35th Institute on
Mineral Law 94 (1988).
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e. Operating Interest
"Operating interest" is defined as "a mineral lease or sublease of a mineral
lease, or an interest in a lease or sublease that gives the lessee, either singly or
in association with others, the right to conduct the operations giving rise to the
claimant's privilege."40 If, before the claimant's privilege is established, the
owner of a mineral lease or sublease, or an interest in the lease or sublease, has
divested himself of the right to conduct operations by assignment, sublease or
other form of mineral right, then such owner no longer owns an "operating
interest."'4 1 Further, a farmout or farmin neither creates an operating interest in
the farmee, nor divests the operating interest of the farmor until the sublease or
transfer contemplated by the farmout or farmin is made.42 Thus, the privilege
provided by the statute will attach to the farmor's entire operating interest, and
not the more limited interest of the farmee, until the assignment contemplated
under the farmout agreement is made. Until such time, the farmee is a
"contractor" 43 of the lessee/farmor.
Thus, the definition of "operating interest"" codifies the results reached in
JHJ Ltd. I v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.4 and Lor, Inc. v. Martin Exploration Co."
In those cases, the claimants were held to have a lien on the whole of the
original lease when the privilege resulted from operations conducted on a portion
of the lease by virtue of a farmout agreement. The reasoning of the courts, now
codified in the new Act, is that no contractual relationship existed between the
lessor and the farmee until the farmee had completed the specified operations and
earned its interest; thus, no sublease was created until the occurrence of that
event. Consequently, the privilege was held to attach to the whole of the original
lease.47 Conversely, the result in J.S. Abercrombie v. Lehulu Oil Co. 48 is also
codified. In Abercrombie, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a privilege
affected only the interest of a sublessee where the sublease had been properly
assigned before the oil and gas privilege attached.49
f Lessee
A "lessee" is defined as "a person who owns an operating interest.""
Thus, this definition must be read in tandem with the definition of "operating
40. La. R.S. 9:4861(5)(a) (Supp. 1997).
41. La. R.S. 9:4861(5)(b) (Supp. 1997).
42. La. R.S. 9:4861(5)(c) (Supp. 1997).
43. La. R.S. 9:4861(10) (Supp. 1997).
44. La. R.S. 9:4861(5) (Supp. 1997).
45. 617 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. La. 1985).
46. 489 So. 2d 1326 (La. App. 1st. Cir.), writ denied, 493 So. 2d 1217 (1986).
47. JHJ Ltd., 617 F. Supp. at 734, Lor, 489 So. 2d at 1332.
48. 181 La. 644, 160 So. 126 (La. 1935).
49. d. at 649, 160 So. at 128.
50. La. R.S. 9:4861(6) (Supp. 1997).
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interest."' In addition, the definitions of "operator"52 (who must be a lessee)
and "contractor"' (who cannot be a lessee) are important to a proper under-
standing of whose interest can be encumbered under the new Act. As discussed
hereafter, the definitions of "participating lessee"', and "non-participating
lessee"53 impose further restrictions upon the identification of a lessee for
purposes of identifying a privilege under the new Act.
g. Operator
An "operator" is defined as "a lessee who is personally bound by contract
to the claimant or to a contractor from whom the claimant's activities giving rise
to the privilege emanate."'s6 Since an operator must be a lessee, it follows that
an operator can never be a contractor. That being the case, the new Act, by
combination of the definitions of "operator"57 and "contractor,"58 effectively
eliminates that lien typically referred to in the industry as an "operator's lien,"
which was previously accorded an operator/lessee against operating interests of
non-operating co-lessees who fail to pay their share of operating costs. 9
Likewise, a non-operating lessee cannot claim a privilege under the new Act
against an operator/lessee for obligations owed, since such non-operator does not
meet the definitional requirement of a "contractor." 60 In contrast, neighboring
Texas has long been unsettled as to whether an operator is entitled to statutory
protection under its mineral lien statute.6 ' However, a Texas operator may
enforce a contractual lien under a joint operating agreement against its indebted
non-operators, 6 and may make the lien effective against third party lien
claimants or purchasers of production by having the JOA acknowledged and
recorded in the proper county.63
51. La. R.S. 9:4861(5) (Supp. 1997).
52. La. R.S. 9:4861(7) (Supp. 1997).
53. La. R.S. 9:4861(10) (Supp. 1997).
54. La. R.S. 9:4861(8) (Supp. 1997).
55. La. R.S. 9:4861(9) (Supp. 1997).
56. La. R.S. 9:4861(7) (Supp. 1997).
57. Id.
58. La. R.S. 9:4861(10) (Supp. 1997).
59. See e.g., Blasingame v. Anderson. 236 La. 505, 519, 108 So. 2d 105. 109 (La. 1959):
Compadres. Inc. v. Johnson Oil and Gas Corp., 547 So. 2d 382, 386 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989);
Kenmore Oil Co. v. Delacroix, 316 So. 2d 468, 469 (La. App. Ist Cit. 1975).
60. La. R.S. 9:4861(10) (Supp. 1997).
61. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 56.001 (West 1995); see Energy Fund of America, Inc. v. G.E.T.
Sere. Co., 610 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ayco Dev. Corp.
v. G.E.T. Sere. Co., 616 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. 1981).
62. Drake v. McGalin, 626 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
63. S. Rand Stinnett, Contractual and Statutory Liens in the Oil Patch, Suing, Defending &
Negotiating with Oil & Gas Producers. Professional Development Program D-29 (1985).
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The operator's lien remains intact under the new Act, however, for so-called
"turnkey" operators" or other contractors who operate properties for a fee while
owning no interest in the leasehold or production derived therefrom. In that
case, the person or entity conducting operations still qualifies as a "contractor"
under the statute and will have the same lien rights as any other supplier of labor
or materials associated with the drilling or operation of an oil and gas well.
IL Participating Lessee; Non-Participating Lessee
A "participating lessee" and a "non-participating lessee" are distinctly
defined under the new Act.' Under prior law, questions concerning the reach
of the privilege as to the interest of participating and non-participating working
interest owners were largely ignored and left up to the courts to answer.
Through its definitions, the new Act specifically describes the liabilities of those,
parties for unit operations giving rise to claims for which a privilege can be
asserted. Likewise, since oil and gas operations are rarely conducted by one
company or individual, the new Act accounts for the liabilities of both
participating and non-participating working interest owners involved in both
voluntary and involuntary unit operations. A non-participating lessee's in rem
liability ' for claims of privilege arising out of unit operations is limited to the
unit boundaries; thus, the privilege will not extend to the non-participating
lessee's interest in other units in which the lease may participate or in other wells
that may be located on the lease.6" In contrast, the participating lessee's interest
in such other units and lease wells will remain subject to the privilege granted
by the new Act.
i. Contractor
As indicated above, a "contractor" cannot be a lessee; thus, the traditional
operator/lessee no longer qualifies as a "contractor."' Any number of subcon-
tractors, however, may qualify as a contractor, but only if such persons or entities
have contracted to perform "operations,"70 which, by definition, must occur "on
a well site."' As a result, certain persons or entities who qualified as contrac-
tors under prior statutes may not enjoy a privilege under the new Act if their
services or equipment were provided at a location remote from the well site.
64. 8 Howard R. Williams & Charles J. Meyers, Oil & Gas Law 1163 (1995).
65. La. R.S. 9:4861(10) (Supp. 1997).
66. La. R.S. 9:4861(8)-(9) (Supp. 1997).
67. The new Act does not change prior law holding that no personal liability is attached by the
privilege. See, e.g., Ogden Oil Co. v. Venture Oil Corp., 490 So. 2d 725 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
68. La. R.S. 9:4863(B) (Supp. 1997).
69. La. R.S. 9:4861(10) (Supp. 1997).
70. id.
71. La. R.S. 9:4861(4)(a) (Supp. 1997).
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j. Third Person
A "third person" is defined as "a person, including a lessee or operator, who
is not contractually bound to the claimant for the obligation secured by a
privilege or who has not expressly assumed the obligation."72 Although this
definition, on its face, appears inconsequential, the effect of this definition, when
applied under the further provisions of the new Act, at least suggests that persons
or entities who do not qualify as "third persons" may be subject to a virtually
imprescriptible lien in favor of a "claimant."73 Although this result is never
specifically stated in the new Act, a review of its provisions demonstrates that
the privilege may lose its "effect" 74 against third persons, but would be extant
against all others (i.e., presumably, those who are contractually bound to
claimant) until the underlying obligation becomes extinct or the claimant
consents to the extinguishment of the privilege.75
k. Well Site
Although the new Act has excluded transportation and gathering activities
from the range of the privilege, 6 the meaning of a well site is broader than
allowed by a literal reading (without benefit of definitions) of the prior statute,
which tied the provision of services or equipment to the "well or wells." 7 By
definition, under the new Act, the "well site"71 is not physically limited to the
location where the activity giving rise to the privilege actually takes place. A
well site will include the operating interest(s) of the lessee(s) conducting the
operation that gives rise to the privilege. With respect to unit operations, the
well site also includes all operating interests included in the unit. Likewise,
surface locations for directional wells, injection and disposal wells, and tank
batteries or other production and processing facilities are also covered within the
definition of "well site. 79 Nonetheless, although the well site is not restricted
to the exact physical location of a well, the qualifying definition of "operations,"
as discussed above," along with Section 9:4862, which describes the persons
entitled to the privilege,"' allows the privilege only to those persons who have
provided a direct benefit to the traditional well location.
72. La. R.S. 9:4861(11) (Supp. 1997).
73. La. R.S. 9:4861(1) (Supp. 1997).
74. La. R.S. 9:4865 (Supp. 1997).
.75. La. R.S. 9:4864(B) (Supp. 1997).
76. La. R.S. 9:4861(4)(b) (Supp. 1997).
77. La. R.S. 9:4861 (1991).
78. La. R.S. 9:4861(12) (Supp. 1997).
79. Id.
80. 'La. R.S. 9:4861(4) (Supp. 1997).
81. La. R.S. 9:4862 (Supp. 1997).
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2. Activities Giving Rise to the Privilege (Section 9:4862)
Once becoming familiar with the definitions provided in the new Act, one
must apply their meaning to the remaining provisions of the new statute.
Section 4862(A) of the new Act grants a privilege to persons who perform
services or provide materials in connection with "operations. ' 'a 2 As indicated
above, "operations" are limited to activities "conducted by or for a lessee on a
well site."s3 Presumably, unless otherwise stated in Section 4862(A), materials
or services supplied to the well site must actually be incorporated therein. In
addition, since "operations" do not include labor and services performed in
connection with the operation or construction of a pipeline or other transportation
away from such a well site, u the new Act revives the law as stated by the court
in McGee v. Missouri Valley Dredging Co.," which denied a privilege for work
associated with the construction of a natural gas transmission pipeline on the
basis that it was beyond the scope of the oil and gas lien statute as it then
existed.s Prior to the new Act, McGee had been, in effect, overturned by Act
949 of 1984, which extended the privilege to cover those who provided labor and
services in connection with certain pipeline activities.87
Although, even under prior statutes, a claimant's work or services had to
have a fairly clear connection with the drilling or operation of a well, it was not
always necessary that the work had to be performed on the well or lease
itself."8 Nonetheless, claimants whose activities were performed or conducted
far from the actual drilling or production operation typically were denied the
benefit under former lien statutes." As a result, certain furnishers and suppliers
who may have prevailed in claiming a privilege under prior law may be less
successful under the new Act if their activities cannot be clearly tied to the well
site. However, the new Act may still contain a "loop hole" for certain
claimants-even where their activities might otherwise seem remote-if such
82. La. R.S. 9:4862(A) (Supp. 1997).
83. La. R.S. 9:4861(4)(a) (Supp. 1997).
84. La. R.S. 9:4861(4)(b) (Supp. 1997).
85. 182 So. 2d 764 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
86. La. R.S. 9:4861-4887 (1991).
87. 1984 La. Acts No. 949 (amending La. R.S. 9:4861).
88. P.H.A.C. Serv., Inc. v. Seaways Int'l, Inc., 403 So. 2d 1199 (La. 1981). See also C.F.
Dahlberg & Co., Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 836 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1988) (steel supplied to
offshore drilling deck)- Continental Casualty Co. v. Associated Pipe & Supply Co., 310 F. Supp.
1207 (E.D. La. 1969), a.rfd, 447 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1971) (services to offshore pipeline
construction); Texas Pipe and Supply Co. v. Coon Ridge Pipeline Co.. 506 So. 2d 1296 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1987) (pipe furnisher).
89. Hebert. Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Properties, Ltd., 914 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1990) (title
abstractor); Sandoz v. A.M.F. Tuboscope, Inc., 61 B.R. 1020 (W.D. La. 1986) (insurance premiums);
Baker Chemicals, Inc. v. TXO Prod. Co., 556 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990) (drilling mud and
materials not delivered to well site); Melyn Indus., Inc. v. Sofec. Inc., 392 So. 2d 733 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1980) (supplier for construction of steel buoys); McGee v. Missouri Valley Dredging Co., 182
So. 2d 764 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966) (surveyor).
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activities are deemed performed by a "contractore ° for the benefit of "persons
performing labor or services on a well site located" offshore.9' Further, there
may be the rare claimant who failed to enjoy a privilege under prior law, but
-who benefits from the more specific language of the new Act. For example, in
the 1987 case of P & A Well Service, Inc. v. Blackies Power Swivels, Inc.,"7 the
lessor of certain drilling equipment was denied a privilege under the statute as
it then existed, since the claimant had not furnished equipment directly to the
well site; instead, such lessor had rented equipment to a contractor without any
knowledge as to where it would be used. However, if the equipment was leased
to a "contractor"' 3 and was used in "operations,"'" the new Act, arguably,
would allow such a lessor (of the drilling equipment) to enjoy a privilege for rent
that accrued while the equipment was still located on the well site.95
The list of persons entitled to claim the privilege pursuant to Section
4862(A) of the new Act may severely restrict the right of a furnisher of a
furnisher (or a supplier of a supplier) to successfully claim a privilege unless
such.furnishers and suppliers fall within the definition of a "contractor"' 6 or, in
the alternative, to qualify as a "seller ... to an operator or contractor" of
movables either incorporated at the well site or consumed in operations
thereof.' Regardless, the new Act clearly extends the privilege to persons such
as caterers, launderers, and crew boat and charter boat providers who provide
their services to offshore locations,"8 but it does not include providers of the
same sort of services to onshore operations. The underlying rationale for this
distinction is the greater effort of persons who provide catering, laundry, crew
boat and charter boat services to offshore locations; whereas, persons who
provide food or transportation to onshore locations (e.g., fast food restaurants and
taxi companies) expend considerably less effort in providing such services. In
addition, these providers of onshore services probably have no expectation of
enjoying a privilege upon an operating interest in the event they are not paid."
Early reaction to the new Act from practitioners raised the concern that the
phrase "waters of the state," as it appears in Section 4862(A),, °° was intended
to exclude the new Act's application to the Outer Continental Shell ("OCS").
90. La. R.S. 9:4861(10) (Supp. 1997).
91. La. R.S. 9:4862(2) (Supp. 1997).
92. 507 So. 2d 280 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
93. La. R.S. 9:4861(10) (Supp. 1997).
94. La. R.S. 9:4861(4)(a) (Supp. 1997).
95. La. R.S. 9:4862(A)(7) (Supp. 1997).
96. La. R.S. 9:4861(10) (Supp. 1997).
97. La. R.S. 9:4862(A)(6) (Supp. 1997).
98. La. R.S. 9:4862(A)(2)(5), (6)(c) (Supp. 1997).
99. Chicoine, supra note 4, at 12. Practically, this result seems unlikely since it would be
difficult to obtain the services of a fast food restaurant or taxi company if payment is not received
at the time the services are rendered.
100. La. R.S. 9:4862(A)(2)(5), (6)(c) (Supp. 1997).
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This was not the intent of the Act's drafters.' 0 ' The OCS Lands Act directive
to apply the law of adjacent states as the surrogate law of the OCS'02 is well
established, and Louisiana courts have consistently applied prior lien statutes to
OCS operations. 3
The obligations secured by the privilege created under the new Act at
Section 4862(B) are nearly identical to those stated under the prior statute.'
Thus, courts interpreting the new Act should reach similar results as to the
amount due,'03 legal interest,' and attorney's fees."3 In the latter in-
stance, however, the new Act limits recovery of attorney's fees to those that are
"reasonable" and do not exceed ten percent (10%)."0s The prior law allowed
the privilege to secure attorneys' fees equal to 10% of the obligation owed."3
3. Property to Which the Privilege Attaches (Section 9:4863)
In its broadest reach, the privilege granted under the new Act attaches to the
entire "operating interest under which the operations" are being conducted, as
well as to such interest's rights (i) in certain described facilities located "on the
well site," (ii) to non-transient movables located on the well site (for use in
operations), and (iii) to related tracts, servitudes and leases."0  Thus, the
interests of the operator and both participating and non-participating lessees are
attached, although the encumbrance upon the non-participating lessee's operating
interest is limited."' The breadth of the Louisiana statute in this respect is,
perhaps, best realized when compared with the mineral lien law adopted in the
State of Texas." 2 Texas claimants have long been frustrated by the fact that
the mineral lien allowed under the Texas Property Code attaches only to the
101. Chicoine, supra note 4, at 22.
102. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(2) (1994).
103. Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Eng'g, Inc.. 895 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1990); C.F.
Dahlberg & Co. v. Chevron U.S.A.. Inc., 836 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1988); St. Mary Iron Works, Inc.
v. McMoran Exploration Co., 809 F.2d 1130 (5th Cir. 1987); Continental Casualty Co. v. Associated
Pipe & Supply Co., 310 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D. La. 1969), affd, 447 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1971); Genina
Marine Serv.. Inc. v. Mark Producing Co., 490 So. 2d 1158 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 494 So.
2d 541 (1986); Genina Marine Serv., Inc. v. ARCO Oil & Gas Co., 499 So. 2d 257 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1968).
104. Compare La. R.S. 9:4861 (1991) with La. R.S. 9:4862(B) (Supp. 1997).
105. Shamsie v. Pyramid Petroleum, Inc., 577 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991); Amoco Prod.
Co. v. Horwell Energy, Inc., 969 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1992).
106. Trew v. Standard Supply & Hardware Co., 33 So. 2d 426, 428 (La. App. Or. 1947).
107. lit; Continental Casualty Co. v. Associated Pipe & Supply Co., 31 F. Supp. 1207, 1214
(E.D. La. 1969), affd, 447 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1971).
108. La. R.S. 9:4862(B)(4) (Supp. 1997).
109. La. R.S. 9:4861 (1991).
110. La. R.S. 9:4863(A)(1) (Supp. 1997).
111. La. R.S. 9:4863(B) (Supp, 1997).
112. Codified at Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 56.001 (West 1995).
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interest of the mineral property owner"' who contracts with claimant/mineral
contractor' 14 and not to the underlying fee interest or a non-operating (non-
contracting) interest." s Practically speaking, therefore, the operator's interest
is the only portion of the "operating interest" attached in Texas. The non-
operator's interest is typically excluded from attachment"' 6 unless a distinct
form of partnership or joint venture (outside of the joint operating agreement)
can be shown." 7
The new Act restates prior law, in place since the Legislature's adoption of
Act No. 100 in 1956," s providing for the establishment of the privilege over
proceeds." 9 Thus. Louisiana continues to provide a more useful lien statute
than Texas, where claimants are denied a lien upon the proceeds of production,
which severely limits the effectiveness of and recovery under that state's oil and
gas lien statute. 2
As earlier indicated, in the case of unit operations conducted on either a
voluntary or involuntary unit in Louisiana, the property subject to the privilege
may be limited if the lessee is a "non-participating lessee"'' rather than a
"participating lessee." 21  The rationale underlying this distinction is based on
the equitable principle that one who elects to go non-consent under an operating
agreement should only have its interest encumbered to the extent such interest
is improved by the work or equipment of the lien claimant.23  Therefore, a
non-participating lessee's interest in a unit is attached only to the extent of the
unitized zone or formation (and property related to such operations); any
operating interest held by the non-participating lessee in a portion of the lease
lying beyond the boundaries of an effected unit would not be covered.'
Presumably, the affected unit (whether voluntary or involuntary) must be created
or formed before the performance of activities giving rise to the privilege if the
non-participating lessee is to enjoy the benefit of the Act's restrictive limitations
113. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 56.001(3) (West 1995).
114. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 56.001(2) (West 1995).
115. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 56.003 (West 1995); Bethlehem Supply Corp. v. Wotola Royalty
Corp., 165 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Tex. 1945).
116. Ayco Dev. Corp. v. G.E.T. Serv. Co.. 616 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tex. 1981); Energy Fund of
America v. G.E.T. Serv. Co., 610 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd on other grounds,
616 S.W.2d 184 (1981).
117. See, e.g., State v. Harrington, 407 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 944. 87
S. Ct. 977 (1967) (joint management shown); Pan American Petroleum Corp v. Long, 340 F.2d 211
(5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 926 (1965) (passive investor protected).
118. 1956 La. Acts No. 100.
119. La. R.S. 9:4863(A)(4) (Supp. 1997).
120. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 56.003 (West 1995); Hess v. Bank of Oklahoma, 61 B.R. 977, 978
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986); Wilkins v. Fecht, 356 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Ct. App. 1962); Crowley v. Adams
Bros. & Prince, 262 S.W. 883, 885 (Tex. Ct. App. 1924).
121. La. R.S. 9:4861(9) (Supp. 1997).
122. La. R.S. 9:4861(8) (Supp. 1997).
123. Chicoine, supra note 4. at 26.
124. La. R.S. 9:4863(B) (Supp. 1997).
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for unit operations. Further, note that the distinction between participating and
non-participating lessees applies only with respect to unit operations.' Non-
participating operating interests related to operations conducted on a single
leasehold gain no additional protection under the new Act. It follows, therefore,
that the non-participating lessee's interest in other wells located upon such lease,
in addition to such lessee's interest in other unitized wells and production in
which such non-participating lessee's lease participates, will be within the grasp
of the privilege even in those instances where the non-participating lessee did not
participate in a specific operation from which the privilege emanates. Except for
those limitations to attaching a non-participating lessee's operating interest, the
new Act is consistent with prior law in allowing all unit interests, leases and
wells, to be encumbered. 26
In a departure from prior law,'27 the Louisiana privilege attaches only to
those drilling or other rigs found at the well site, and only if "owned by the
operator or ... contractor" whose activities give rise to such privilege."
Thus, the new Act legislatively overrules the results reached in the Ogden
cases,'" where claims of 'privilege by prior workover contractors were recog-
nized against other contractors' workover rigs, notwithstanding that such rigs had
been moved to the well location after performance of the services giving rise to
the privilege. Although the decisions in both Ogden cases likely were correct
when rendered under then effective law,'30 such claims would not be upheld
under the new Act since the rigs, in both Ogden cases, were owned by
contractors other than those whose activities gave rise to the privilege.' 3'
In analyzing ownership of the operating interest attached by the privi-
lege,"' the effect of the law as it concerns the use of farmouts is criti-
125. La. R.S. 9:4863(B) (Supp. 1997).
126. Standard Supply & Hardware Co. v. Humphrey Brothers, 209 La. 979, 987, 26 So. 2d 8,
11 (La. 1946); J.HJ. Ltd. I v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 729, 732 (M.D. La. 1985); accord
Lor, Inc. v. Martin Exploration Co.. 489 So. 2d 1326 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 493 So. 2d
1217 (1986). Not surprisingly, Texas courts have extended the mineral lien encumbrance only
gingerly to unit operations and, even in those instances, only the interest of the actual contracting
party (i.e., generally the operator) will be attached. Oil Field Salvage Co. v. Simon, 168 S.W.2d 848
(Tex. 1943); Texcalco, Inc, v. McMillan, 524 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975). But see Dunigan
Tool & Supply Co. v. Burris, 427 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968), where only one of three leases
that might otherwise have comprised a drilling unit was allowed to be attached.
127. See Ogden Oil Co. v. Servco, 611 F. Supp. 572 (M.D. La. 1985) and Ogden Oil Co., Inc.
v. Venture Oil Corp., 490 So. 2d 725 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986). where rigs placed at the well site after
the debt was incurred were encumbered by the privilege.
128. La. R.S. 9:4863(A)(2) (Supp. 1997).
129. Ogden Oil Co. v. Servco, 611 F. Supp. 572 (M.D. La. 1985); Ogden Oil Co., Inc. v,
Venture Oil Corp., 490 So. 2d 725 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
130. La. R.S. 9:4861 (1983).
131. La. R.S. 9:4863(A)(l)(b), (2) (Supp. 1997). Under the new Act, the lien attaches only to
the "drilling or other rig located at the well site of the operating interest if the rig is owned by the
operator or by a contractor from whom the activities giving rise to the privilege emanate."
132. La. R.S. 9:4861(5) (Supp. 1997); La. R.S. 9:4863 (Supp. 1997).
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cal.'3 Again, if unproven acreage of an otherwise productive lease is farmed
out and privileges arise as a result of operations performed under the farmout
agreement, but no assignments or subleases have yet been transferred, such
privileges will attach to the entire leasehold, including all production attributable
to the lease, whether from wells physically situated on the lease or as a result of
the leases inclusion in a producing unit."3 However, if the assignment or
sublease of the operating interest under the farmout arrangement occurs prior to
the activities giving rise to a claim of privilege, only the operating interest
subject to the sublease or assignment will be "a lessee of the operating interest"
under the new Act and the remainder of the operating interest in the original
lease will not be encumbered.'
It is well established under Louisiana jurisprudence that the privilege
attaches to all property listed in the statute, regardless of whether a contractual
relationship exists between the person claiming the privilege and the owner of
the property to which it attaches." 6 This result is not altered by the revised
Act. Likewise, it follows that the owner of the property subject to the claim of
privilege need not be the debtor of, or for that matter have any relationship
whatsoever with, the lien claimant. If the criteria for establishing a claim of
privilege under the Act are met, the property described in the new Act will be
encumbered."3
It is equally well established, however, that- the lien statute will be
interpreted in accordance with the principle of strictijuris; thus, the privilege will
only attach to those items specifically set forth in the statute and will not attach
to any other property of the obligor. 13  Therefore, under the new Act, the
privilege will attach only to the operating interest and the specific facilities,
movables and real property described insofar as they benefit the well site
(including drilling or other rigs). 139  The proceeds received by, and the
obligations owed to, a lessee "from production" are also encumbered by the
privilege.'4 Under prior law, however, other intangibles such as insurance
133. La. R.S. 9:4861(5)(c) (Supp. 1997). See J.S. Abercrombie v. Lehulu Oil Co., 181 La. 644,
160 So. 126 (La. 1935); J.H.J. Ltd. I v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 617 S. Supp. 729 (M.D. La. 1985).
134. J.H.J. Ltd. 1, 617 F. Supp. at 732.
135. La. R.S. 9:4863(C)(1) (Supp. 1997). See Abercrombie, 181 La. at 644. 160 So. at 126.
136. Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Parker, 261 F. Supp. 257 (W.D. La. 1965); Sklar v. Lilly-Thompson
Drilling Corp., 45 F. Supp. 470 (W.D. La. 1942), affd sub nom. Sklar v. Oil Incomes, Inc., 133 F.2d
512 (Sth Cir. 1943); Guichard Drilling Co. v. Alpine Energy Sources, Inc., 657 So. 2d 1307 (La.
1995). Oil Well Supply Co. v. Independent Oil Co., 54 So. 2d 330 (La. 1951); Sargent v. Freeman,
204 La. 997, 16 So. 2d 737 (La. 1943); Fred E. Cooper, Inc. v. Farr, 165 So. 2d 605 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1964); Sutton-Zwoile Oil Co. Inc. v. Barr Petroleum Corp., 197 So. 432 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940);
Odom v. McClanahan, 196 So. 382 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940); Blankenship v. Stovall, 159 So. 477
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1935); Boudreaux v. Moon Oil Co., 158 So. 672 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935).
137. Id
138. Easle Star Ins., 211 F. Supp. at 261.
139. La. R.S. 9:4863(A) (Supp. 1997).
140. La. R.S. 9:4863(A)(4) (Supp. 1997).
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proceeds were clearly excluded from the privilege under the principle of stricti
juris since such were not specifically recited in the lien statute. 4' Under the
new Act, "obligations owed" to a lessee are also encumbered; thus, certain
intangibles such as accounts receivable, insofar as they relate to the lessee's
"disposition of hydrocarbons [that are] subject to the privilege" may be
encumbered. 42 Since Louisiana courts seem divided as to whether Louisiana
privileges are to be strictly or broadly construed, the breadth of interpretation
given to the extent of "obligations" that will be attached is not completely
certain.1
43
Consistent with the stricti juris approach and the intent of the new Act, like
its predecessor statutes, to provide security for a claim, the new statute creates
only in rem liability for attachment by the claim of privilege.'" Any personal
liability between the claimant and obligor must have been created by the contract
described under the definition of "contractor" and is not created by the statute
itself.'4
Historically, the Louisiana privilege has not been interpreted to attach to the
landowner's property or the improvements thereon (since such interests were
never recited in the statute).'1s The new Act clarifies prior law by expressly
excluding "an operating interest that is owned by a lessor, sublessor, overriding
royalty owner, or other person who is not a lessee of the operating interest," as
well as any "obligations or proceeds" owed to such person. 41
4. Establishment and Extinguishment of the Lien (Section 9:4864)
Although similar to prior law, Section 9:4864 of the new Act clarifies when
the privilege is first established. 48  Under the new text, the privilege is
established as to all persons on the date the claimant first provides its services,
equipment, transportation or other operations for the benefit of the affected
141. Eagle Star Ins., 261 F. Supp. at 261.
142. La. R.S. 9:4863(A)(4) (Supp. 1997).
143. The Louisiana Supreme Court appears to have relied upon the rule of strict construction.
See Oil Well Supply Co. v. Independent Oil Co., 219 La. 936. 54 So. 2d 330 (La. 1951); J.S.
Abercrombie v. Lehulu Oil Co., 181 La. 644, 160 So. 126 (La. 1935). Courts of Appeal, however,
have adopted a more liberal construction. See Texas Pipe & Supply Co. v. Coon Ridge Pipeline Co.,
506 So. 2d 1296 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); Ogden Oil Co., Inc. v. Venture Oil Corp., 490 So. 2d 725
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
144. Gulchard Drilling Co. v. Alpine Energy Services. Inc., 657 So. 2d 1307. 1314 (La. 1995);
Lor, Inc. v. Martin Exploration Co., 489 So. 2d 1326 (La. App. 1st Cir.). writ denied. 493 So. 2d
1217 (1986); Ogden Oil Co. v. Venture Oil Corp., 490 So. 2d 725, 729 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
145. La. R.S. 9:4861(10) (Supp. 1997).
146. Tracy v. Hewitt, 92 So. 2d 757. 759 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957).
147. La. R.S. 9:4863(C) (Supp. 1997).
148. La. R.S. 9:4864 (Supp. 1997). The prior statute was not judicially interpreted until May
1996, when the United States Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit held that the lien attached as of
the date services were first provided. In re Century Management Corp. (Grasso Production v. BMO
Financial Inc.), 83 F.3d 140 (6th Cir. 1996).
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interest." 9  Further, even prior to recordation of a notice (statement) of
privilege, the lien is effective as to third persons (i.e., those not contractually
bound to the claimant) as of the' date of such first provision of services,
equipment or other operations.' However, if a claimant does not timely file
its statement of privilege as required by Section 9:4865 of the new Act,'3 ' the
privilege will cease to exist and will be extinguished as against third persons at
the end of the filing period. 2 As before, a privilege will be extinguished at
the time the underlying obligation is fully satisfied or otherwise lapses by, for
example, the consent of the claimant.
5 3
In an effort to clarify the date of "last activity" for purposes of determining
the ultimate filing date for preserving an effective privilege against third persons,
the new Act now makes it clear that the right to a single privilege will continue
when no more than ninety (90) consecutive days elapse between the completion
of previous operations or activities and the initiation of new operations or
activities, and provided such operations or activities are performed for the benefit
of the same operating interest.'"
5. Cessation of the Privilege Against Third Persons (Section 9:4865)
Recordation was essential under prior law to preserve the privilege granted
by the statute. 55 Under the new Act, recordation of the privilege is still
required to maintain its effect against third persons.5 6 In this respect, the new
Act merely codifies existing law.' 7 However, since the Act imposes a 180-
day filing requirement only for purposes of being effective as to "third
persons,"' 53 an unrecorded privilege remains viable after the 180-day period as
against the claimant's contractor (i.e., the person or entity with whom claimant
contracted). Thus, although the privilege will not be effective against third
persons beyond the 180-day period absent recordation, it will remain effective
beyond that time and be enforceable against claimant's contractor (but only to
the extent of the property recited in Section 9:4863) so long as the underlying
obligation exists. This is a reasonable result since claimant's direct contractor
will have knowledge of the particular facts that recordation is designed to impute
149. La. R.S. 9:4864(A) (Supp. 1997).
150. Id.
151. La. R.S. 9:4865 (Supp. 1997).
152. Id See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Best Oilfield Serv., Inc., 48 F.3d 913 (5th Cir. 1995).
153. La. R.S. 9:4864(B) (Supp. 1997).
154. La. R.S. 9:4864(C) (Supp. 1997).
155. See 1986 La. Acts No. 191, which legislatively overruled Louisiana Materials Co. v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 493 So. 2d 1141 (La. 1986), which held that recordation was not necessary
to preserve but only affected the rank of the lien.
156. La. R.S. 9:4865 (Supp. 1997).
157. Compadres, Inc. v. Johnson Oil & Gas Corp., 547 So. 2d 382 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989);
Hawn Tool Co. v. Crystal Oil Co., 514 So. 2d 636 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
158. La. R.S. 9:4865 (Supp. 1997).
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to third parties. This result is a departure, however, from the holding in Hawn
Tool Company v. Crystal Oil Company, 59 where the court analyzed Act 191
of 1986 and observed that a person's failure to record a lien statement
extinguished the privilege, apparently as to all persons.' 6 In this same regard,
although the new Act still requires that a claimant bring an action to enforce its
privilege within one (1) year after filing a notice of privilege, such requirement
only concerns the continuing effect of the privilege against third persons.' 6'
No such enforcement action is mandated under the new Act to preserve a
claimant's privilege against its direct contractor. The absence of such a
requirement suggests the privilege is imprescriptible between parties bound by
contract or other direct obligation.' 62
The new Act recognizes the additional recordation procedures and require-
ments brought about, effective January 1, 1990, by Louisiana's adoption of Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.163 Now, the statute provides that the
statement of privilege will be recorded in the mortgage records of the parish;"u
however, notice of privileges encumbering rigs must be filed in accordance with
financing statement requirements set forth in Chapter 9 of Title 10 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes (but the signature of the debtor shall not be required).' 65
Due process and notice concerns arising under prior law' 66 have been
addressed in the new Act. Now, if the privilege is to continue to have effect against
third persons not joined in the enforcement action described at Section 9:4865(B),
a notice of lis pendens must be filed in the parish mortgage records where the
encumbered property is located, or, in the alternative, the claimant must seize the
affected property within thirty (30) days after the enforcement action is institut-
ed. 67 Of course, no lis pendens requirement is imposed to preserve a privilege
against a drilling or other rig where a financing statement is properly filed in
accordance with the new Act.'"
For purposes of comparison, it may be interesting to note how the new Act
would have impacted the outcome of three (3) particular cases decided by courts
interpreting the enforcement provisions of the Louisiana lien statute. Although each
of the following cases was decided around the time the new Act took effect (i.e.,
August 15, 1995), the courts were considering the prior lien statute in each
instance. 69
159. 514 So. 2d 636 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
160. lit at 637.
161. La. R.S. 9:4865(B) (Supp. 1997).
162. See infra notes 257-264.
163. Codified at La. R.S. 10:9-101 (1993 and Supp. 1997).
164. La. R.S. 9:4865(A) (Supp. 1997).
165. La. R.S. 9:4865(AX2) (Supp. 1997). See La. R.S. 10:9-402 (Supp. 1997).
166. See Guichard Drilling Co. v. Alpine Energy Serv., Inc., 657 So. 2d 1307, 1314 (La. 1995).
167. La. R.S. 9:4865(C) (Supp. 1997).
168. Id.
169. La. R.S. 9:4865 (1991).
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In Guichard Drilling Company v. Alpine Energy Services, Inc.,t70 a
subcontractor filed an action against a contractor to enforce a default judgment
recognizing a lien granted under the prior statute. Such default judgment had been
previously obtained by the subcontractor in a separately filed proceeding. The
subcontractor also sought to garnish property owned by the operator and non-
operators, none of whom had been made defendants in the subcontractor's original
suit against its contractor for recognition of the privilege. The court held that the
lien attached only to the property identified in the statute and, thus, the owners of
such property (i.e., the operator and non-operators) were not indispensable parties
to the original suit (where the privilege was recognized).'17' The court found that
minimum due process requirements had been satisfied since both the operator and
non-operators had received copies of the subcontractor's lien affidavit.' Notice
of is pendens also had been filed subsequent to the timely filing of the original
action (i.e., within one year of the recordation of the statement of lien claim).'73
If Guichard were decided under the new Act, the outcome likely would be the
same. Consistent with the new Act, a notice of lis pendens had been filed and all
other requirements, such as filing an action within a year of recordation of the
notice of privilege, were met.1 Further, nothing in the new Act requires that the
operator and non-operators be deemed indispensable parties to the enforcement
action under the facts presented. Thus, despite the criticism of Guichard by some
Louisiana legal scholars,'7 such ruling seems an attempt by the Louisiana
Supreme Court to recognize the jurisprudential trend established by Louisiana
appellate courts to liberally construe the Louisiana privilege in a manner to offer
the broadest protection to those providing enhancements to the property of the
operating interest owners. 1
76
Although the decision in Supreme Contractors, Inc. v. Halliburton Logging
Services, Inc., " would probably be the same under the new Act, the result would
be reached for different, or at least clearer, reasons. In Supreme Contractors, the
court held in favor of Halliburton, which had not been timely joined in an otherwise
timely filed suit, to enforce lien claims under the prior Act. 73  Unlike the
170. 657 So. 2d 1307 (La. 1995).
171. Id. at 1315.
172. Id at 1316.
173. Id
174. La. R.S. 9:4865(B) and (C) (Supp. 1997).
175. Guichard Drilling Co. v. Alpine Energy Ser., Inc., 657 So. 2d 1307. 1319 (La. 1995); see
Louisiana Mineral Law Service--Mineral Law Institute, LSU Law Center, Vol. 14, No. 24, at 2.
176. See Texas Pipe and Supply Co. v. Coon Ridge Pipeline Co., Inc., 506 So. 2d 1296 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1987); Ogden Oil Co. v. Venture Oil Corp., 490 So. 2d 725 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
In the past, the Louisiana Supreme Court has professed a rule of strict construction, e.g. P.H.A.C.
Sere.. Inc. v. Seaways Int'l, Inc., 403 So. 2d 1199 (La. 1981); Oil Well Supply Co. v. Indep. Oil Co.,
219 La. 936, 54 So. 2d 330 (La. 1951); J.S. Abercrombie v. Lehulu Oil Co., 181 La. 644, 160 So.
126 (La. 1935).
177. 668 So. 2d 1363 (La. App. 1st Cir.). writ denied, 672 So. 2d 673 (1996).
178. La. R.S. 9:4861-4887 (1991).
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circumstances supporting the decision in Guichard, Halliburton, apparently, had not
received a copy of the lien affidavit nor had a notice of lis pendens been filed in the
requisite mortgage records. As a result, the machinery and equipment owned by
Halliburton, which had been placed at the well site after performance of the
activities giving rise to the claimant's privilege, were found not to be subject to the
privilege.'
Under the new Act, Supreme Contractors likely would be decided in favor of
Halliburton on the basis that the machinery and equipment of Halliburton,
apparently being only transiently on the well site, would be exempt from the
privilege.'"
The claimant in Phillips Petroleum Company v. Best Oilfield Services,
Inc. s8 also would enjoy a privilege under the new Act. In that case, the court
held that the date of fuel delivery, and not the date the fuel was depleted by use at
the well site, was the date of last activity for determining the requisite filing period
under the prior Act. 82 As a result, the statement of privilege was not timely filed.
Under the new Act, however, the contractor in Phillips Petroleum (being
contractually bound to claimant) is not a "third person"; 3 thus, recordation was
not required to preserve the lien between the claimant and the contractor (although
the lien would not be preserved against third persons1 4).
6. Cessation of the Privilege as to Movable Property (Section 9:4866)
Although the prior statute exempted rigs and other equipment used in plugging
and abandonment operations at the well site, as well as any tubular goods recovered
during plugging and abandonment operations, all other rigs and equipment located
at the well site upon attachment of the privilege were not to be removed from the
property unless the written consent of the lien claimant was first obtained.'
A change in such law has been effected under the new Act." 6 Removal of
property from the well site after the attachment of the privilege is no longer
expressly prohibited. The privilege upon such property is not extinguished at
removal, however, unless the movable is removed by a third person to whom it has
been transferred for good and valuable consideration in good faith."' Since, in
Louisiana, good faith is presumed, recordation of the notice of privilege, without
more, is not sufficient to destroy good faith."' Thus, a third person may meet the
179. Supreme Contractors, 688 So. 2d at 1368.
180. La. R.S. 9:4863(A)(l)(b) (Supp. 1997).
181. 48 F.3d 913 (5th Cir. 1995).
182. La. R.S. 9:4862 (1991).
183. La. R.S. 9:4861(11) (Supp. 1997).
184. La. R.S. 9:4865(A) (Supp. 1997).
185. La. R.S. 9:4861.2 (1991).
186. La. R.S. 9:4866 (Supp. 1997).
187. Id.
188. La. Civ. Code art. 3481.
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good faith test even though a statement of privilege has been properly recorded, and
all or a portion of a claimant's security may be lost without remedy therefor.
7. Notice to Operator; When Required (Section 9:4867)
Although Texas mineral lien law, in other areas, seems not as far reaching as
does the Louisiana oil and gas privilege,'99 the Texas statute has long protected
the mineral property owner (including the land owner and lessees) from double
liability in those instances where a mineral contractor has been paid in full or in part
prior to the time the mineral property owner receives notice of a subcontractor's
claim.' 9 Passage of the new Act now offers a similar remedy to Louisiana
operators (and rig owners) who, under prior statutes, were not given notice of a
subcontractor's claim and often were forced to make double payments to protect
their property.
Timely notice to the operator or rig owner, as appropriate, is now required to
preserve the privilege granted by the new statute unless the claimant has a direct
contractual relationship with the operator or rig owner. 9 If a contractual
relationship has been established, no notice should be or is required since,
presumably, the operator knows the status of his accounts with his contractors. The
operator and rig owner, however, generally do not know the status of their
contractors' accounts with their subcontractors and whether such contractors are
timely paying their subcontractors' invoices. Imposing a requirement upon a
subcontractor to provide notice to the operator/rig owner should reduce those
instances where the operator/rig owner otherwise would be compelled to pay twice
(i.e., once to the contractor and a second time to the contractor's subcontractors
who may have filed privileges against the operator's interests). The problem may
not be entirely eliminated, however, since the privilege attaches immediately upon
the first performance of services covered under the statute, 92 and the claimant
has 180 days after last services to provide the notice. 93
8. Form and Content of the Lien Statement (Section 9:4868)
Although the requirements for the form and content of a statement of
privilege under the new Act'" are set forth in greater detail than in prior
statutes, the information required to be included in such notice of privilege is
189. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62, 112-117, 120 and 126 for discussions of other
Texas law.
190. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 56.043 (West 1995); Energy-Agri Prod., Inc. v. Eisenman Chem.
Co., 717 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
191. La. R.S. 9:4867 (Supp. 1997).
192. La. R.S. 9:4864(A) (Supp. 1997).
193. La. R.S. 9:4865(A) and 4867 (Supp. 1997).
194. La. R.S. 9:4868 (Supp. 1997).
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fairly similar to that required under earlier law. 95 The notice must be in
writing and "signed by or on behalf of the claimant" and must include all of the
following: claimant's name and address, the amount claimed and a description
of the services or materials provided; the obligor's name and address; the well
operator's name as reflected in Louisiana Conservation Commission records; and
a clear description of the operating interest or well affected by the privilege.' 96
It is now clear that a well will be deemed to be adequately identified under the
new Act if the notice includes the well name and serial or other identification
number, as well as the field name, all as designated in the records of the Louisiana
Commissioner of Conservation.' 9 Likewise, any notice required to be given to
an operator under the new Act shall be deemed properly given if delivered to that
operator named in the notice of privilege.'"g In this same regard, the new Act
now lists the particulars necessary to establish proper delivery of a notice of
privilege,'" including the elements that constitute prima facie proof of such
delivery (i.e., a return receipt of registered or certified mailing).20,
If the notice of privilege contains sufficient information to "fairly" apprise the
intended recipient of the nature and object of the privilege, it shall be deemed
valid.3O' In the event a claimant suspects the operator of the well is other than
that shown in the records of the Louisiana Conservation Commissioner (e.g., if a
proper change of operator form has not been filed with the commissioner), a
claimant would be wise to include both the record operator and actual operator in
the statement of privilege to be certain the broadest range of notice is provided.
Although the new Act provides more and clearer specifications as to the form
and content of the required notice of privilege, the information required to be
included therein is similar to that required under prior law. 202  Thus, a lien
affidavit that properly describes the property furnished to a contractor and states
that such property was ultimately "attached to and located at" a production platform
in a specifically described block lying in the Outer Continental Shelf, but does not
expressly describe the leased premises, probably will be deemed an adequate
description of the operating interest upon which the privilege is claimed. °3
Likewise, a description of several lease block numbers and appurtenances should
be held to be a reasonable identification of the property subject to the privilege. 20
In fact, even where a portion of the property description is misleading or incorrect,
195. La. R.S. 9:4862 (1991).
196. La. R.S. 9:4868(A) (Supp. 1997).
197. La. R.S. 9:4868(B)(1) (Supp. 1997).
198. La. R.S. 9:4868(B)(2) (Supp. 1997).
199. La. R.S. 9:4868(C) (Supp. 1997).
200. La. R.S. 9:4868(D) (Supp. 1997).
201. La. R.S. 9:4868(E) (Supp. 1997).
202. La. R.S. 9:4862 (Supp. 1997).
203. Dooley Tackaberry, Inc. v. Freeport McMoRan Oil and Gas Co., 802 F. Supp. 1438 (E.D.
La. 1992).
204. Cameron Offshore Boats, Inc. v. Alpine Ocean Seismic Survey, 862 F. Supp 1578 (W.D.
La. 1994). See also Guichard Drilling Co. v. Alpine Energy Ser., Inc., 657 So, 2d 1307 (La. 1995).
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that portion of the property that is properly described by identifiable lease names
and well numbers may be deemed to fairly apprise a reasonable reader of the
encumbered operating interest.2 Further, a single in globo affidavit of privilege
still may be filed to attach equipment and supplies furnished in connection with the
drilling of several wells located on several contiguous leases provided that such
single affidavit meets the form and content requirements of the new Act.M
Despite Louisiana's historical attachment to the form of an authentic act,'
neither prior Louisiana oil and gas lien statutes nor the new Act require the
statement of privilege to be sworn or acknowledged. This is an interesting contrast
with neighboring Texas, where a sworn affidavit of the claimant must be filed to
secure the lien.2m
9. Effect of Privilege upon Purchaser of Hydrocarbons (Section 9:4869)
Contrary to other oil and gas lien laws where the proceeds of production may
not be attached,' the proceeds of production emanating from the encumbered
operating interest have long been subject to the statutory privilege established in
Louisiana, provided that the purchaser of such production is given adequate notice
of the lien claimed.20 The new Act, however, is far more specific than the prior
statute in stating how the privilege over proceeds may be extinguished.2"
Additionally, the new Act confirms the right of the purchaser of hydrocarbon
production to retain amounts owed for production, without liability, following
receipt of proper notice of the privilege."
It is clear that the privilege over proceeds will be extinguished if production
is transferred in a "bona fide onerous transaction" and consideration is paid
before the purchaser receives notice of the privilege from the claimant. 2 3
Once the purchaser is properly notified of the privilege, however, the claimant
may follow the hydrocarbons or the proceeds therefrom and enforce its privilege
against either in the hands of any subsequent transferee, at the claimant's
election.214 Nonetheless, the privilege may be lost to a claimant if the hydro-
carbons or their proceeds are commingled with other hydrocarbons or proceeds
205. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Best Oilfield Serv., Inc., 48 F.3d 913, 918 (5th Cir. 1995).
206. Mercantile Nat'l Bank of Dallas v. J. Thos. Driscoll, Inc., 194 La. 935,195 So. 497 (La. 1940).
207. E.g., La. Civ. Code art. 1833.
208. See, e.g.. Barrelle v. Johnson. 741 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Conn, Sherrod & Co.,
v. Trt-Electric Supply Co., 535 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976).
209. See, e.g.. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 56.003(b) (West 1995); see Wilkins v. Fecht, 356 S.W.2d
855 (Tex. Ct. App. 1962).
210. Act No. 100 of the 1956 Louisiana Legislature amended the statute of privilege to
encumber proceeds of the working interest and to provide notice to the purchaser of such attachment.
1956 La. Acts No. 100, § 2.
211. La. R.S. 9:4861.1 (1991).
212. La. R.S. 9:4869 (Supp. 1997).
213. La. R.S. 9:4869(A)(l)(a) (Supp. 1997).
214. La. R.S. 9:4869(A)(1)(b) (Supp. 1997).
1156 [Vol. 57
PATRICIA H. CHICOINE
to such a degree as to be beyond reasonable identification."IS Prior statutes did
not expressly address the problem of commingling.
Under the new Act, a purchaser of production (properly notified of the claim
of privilege) "may retain the amounts owed for [such hydrocarbons] without
liability to the claimant or the transferor from whom ... received... until":2 6
the claimant provides written notification to the purchaser to release such
proceeds or advises that the privilege has been released; purchaser receives
written notification from the obligor of the obligation owed to claimant that
purchaser should release such amounts to claimant; purchaser receives a joint
notification from both the claimant and "the person to whom the purchaser owes
the obligation"2 7 to release such amounts; or purchaser is otherwise directed
by appropriate court order. t ' These specific directions, undoubtedly, will
provide comfort to the purchaser of production in dealing with notices of
privilege (or the lack thereof). Again, however, the effects of the above-
described provisions extend only to "third persons";2 19 thus, the privilege will
continue to encumber hydrocarbons and their proceeds to the extent parties are
in actual privity.
10. Ranking of the Privilege (Section 9:4870)
The prior lien statute ranked laborers above all other lien claimants.'
Now, however, all lien claimants share equal rank and priority, except a
contractor's privilege, which is inferior to those to whom such contractor is
contractually bound."' Similarly, as under prior law, the privilege granted
under the new Act shall be outranked by the following types of privileges that
affect the property: ad valorem taxes; mortgagor's and vendor's privileges
provided they have been recorded and are "effective" against third persons before
the claimant's privilege is "established"; and security interests that are perfected
or filed before the privilege is established.
The new statute does not disturb prior law indicating that privileges of equal
rank will share pro rata in any distribution of encumbered proceeds.23
Likewise, if a claimant's privilege has been reduced by proceeds received as a
result of an earlier seizure, such claimant will not have to account for the
215. La. R.S. 9:4869(A)(2) and (3) (Supp. 1997).
216. La. R.S. 9:4869(B) (Supp. 1997).
217. La. R.S. 9:4869(B)(3) (Supp. 1997).
218. La. R.S. 9:4869(B) (Supp. 1997).
219. La. R.S. 9:4861(11), 4869(A) (Supp. 1997).
220. 1928 La. Acts No. 171 gave a first privilege to laborers, which survived through the
Immediately prior statute. La. R.S. 9:4861(B) (1991).
221. La. R.S. 9:4870(A) (Supp. 1997).
222. La. R.S. 9:4870(B) (Supp. 1997); see also La. R.S. 9:4864(A) (Supp. 1997).
223. Republic Supply Co. v. Carthay Land Co., 244 So. 2d 241, 243 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
Accord Lane-Wells Co. v. Continental-EMSCO Co.. 397 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tex. 1965) (applying
Texas mechanics and materialmen's lien statute to oil and gas dispute).
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previously seized funds and may still participate pro rata to the extent of
claimant's remaining privilege in any subsequently seized assets, provided the
privilege held by other claimants was not attached at the time of the prior
seizure.Y4 If other oil and gas privileges are attached at the time a claimant
receives proceeds by seizure, then, under past and current law, all lien claims
participate pro rata in the seized assets.2" Under the new Act, properly filed
mortgages2 6 and vendor's privileges (recorded or unrecorded) that are effective
before the establishment of an oil and gas privilege will prime a later established
oil and gas privilege." 7 However, an otherwise properly effected and recorded
mortgage will be inferior to a privilege under this Act if the privilege claimed
hereunder is "established" (i.e., services or materials have been provided to the
affected property)28 before the mortgage is recorded. 229 This result does not
change prior law.
2
-1
The new Act, in effect, restates the effect of ranking vendor's privileges on
immovables.23' Separate filing requirements for vendor's privileges upon
immovable and movable property, however, have been deleted.232 Now, the
revised statute includes language that recognizes historical recording requirements
for immovables and is consistent with filing and other requirements dictated for
movables under Chapter 9 of Title 10 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. 233
11. Enforcement of the Privilege (Section 9:4871)
The current Act is nearly identical to the prior statute in providing that a
privilege may be enforced "by a writ of sequestration, without the necessity of
furnishing security." 234 However, the writ of sequestration should not be viewed
as the exclusive manner for enforcing the privilege. It is well established that a
claimant may proceed via garnishment or ordinary action as means of preserving
the privilege.25 A judgment entered in an ordinary proceeding acts as a judicial
mortgage, which will be ranked according to Section 4870 of the new Act and will
affect third persons from the time notice of the privilege is first filed.236
224. Republic Supply Co., 244 So. 2d at 241.
225. Id.; La. R.S. 9:4870(A) (Supp. 1997).
226. Young v. Squeeze Tools, Inc., 350 So. 2d 967, 968-69 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
227. In re Martin Exploration Co., 731 F.2d 1210, 1211-12 (5th Cir. 1984).
228. La. R.S. 9:4864(A) (Supp. 1997).
229. La. R.S. 9:4870(B)(2) (Supp. 1997).
230. La. R.S. 9:4862(A)(2) (1991).
231. Compare La. R.S. 9:4862(A)(2) (1991) with La. R.S. 9:4870(B)(2) (Supp. 1997).
232. See La. R.S. 9:4863, 4864 (1991).
233. La. R.S. 9:4870(B)(2), (3) (Supp. 1997); see La. R.S. 10:9-101 (1993).
234. Compare La. R.S. 9:4866 (1991) with La. R.S. 9:4871 (Supp. 1997).
235. Frank's Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Carthay Land Co., 212 So. 2d 161, 163-64
(La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 214 So. 2d 716 (1968). See also Beacon Gasoline Co. v. Sun Oil
Co., 455 F. Supp. 506, 508-09 (W.D. La. 1978).
236. Frank's Casing Crew, 212 So. 2d at 164.
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12. Bonding Requirements; Cancellation of Privilege; Notice of Lis
Pendens (Section 9:4872)
The new Act makes no substantive change in prior law with regard to bonding,
cancellation and lis pendens requirements, although an attempt has been made to
state such requirements in more concise language. 3' An interested party may
still seek cancellation of a privilege or lis pendens by filing a bond, acceptable in
form and content to the appropriate recorder of mortgages, in an amount not less
than 125% of the principal obligation claimed.
238
13. Burden of Prooffor Delivery of Movables to Well Site (Section 9:4873)
Prior law made no definitive statement as to which party carried the burden of
proof in determining whether movables were, in fact, utilized at a well site for
operations and activities giving rise to a claim of privilege. Now, the statute clearly
states that the party resisting the claim of privilege bears the burden of proving that
movables were not used at the well site. 9
1Il. PROBLEMS ARISING UNDER THE NEW Acr
Certainly, the underlying intent of the new Act was to clarify the oil and gas
privilege and to make it more pragmatic in its application. However, it has become
apparent that, since taking effect on August 15, 1995, the new statute, in some
instances, may be ambiguous or may create, unintentionally, problems that will
need to be resolved by future amendment or through judicial interpretation.
A. Elimination of the Operator's Lien
Prior oil and gas well lien statutes 40 have long been interpreted by the
courts to allow the privilege to an operator under a joint operating agreement
over the working interest of non-operating owners to secure payment of drilling
and operating expenses paid by the operator on their behalf.24' Likewise, a
non-operator could enjoy a privilege to secure payment of a co-owner's share of
expenses. 12 Regardless, the elimination of the so-called "operator's lien" from
237. Compare La. R.S. 9:4867 (1991) with La. R.S. 9:4872 (Supp. 1997).
238. La R.S. 9:4872 (Supp. 1997).
239. La. R.S. 9:4873 (Supp. 1997). Unfortunately, under the first publication of the new Act,
a typographical error appears in Section 9:4873 by referring to "9:4862(A)(5y' rather than
"9:4862(A)(6)," which is the correct subprovision referring to movables as security over which the
privilege is established. Id.
240. La. R.S. 9:4861 (1991).
241. Blasingame v. Anderson, 108 So. 2d 105, 110 (La. 1959); Kenmore Oil Co. v. Delacroix,
316 So. 2d 468, 469 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
242. Compadres, Inc. v. Johnson Oil & Gas Corp., 547 So. 2d 382, 385-86 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1989).
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the new Act was intentional since the operating and non-operating lessee,
typically, are not characterized as contractors for other purposes.
It was not intended, however, that the operator/non-operator lessee be
foreclosed from enjoying a similar privilege under some other statute.43 In the
near future, a separate section of the Louisiana Revised Statutes is to be dedicated
specifically to defining and establishing an enforceable operators' lien." Ideally,
this will be accomplished at the Louisiana Legislature's 1997 session.
In the interim, operators who are lessees would be well-advised to take
corrective measures to create a security interest in the operating interest of their
non-operating co-lessees. If parties are amenable, joint operating agreements may
be amended to provide for a conventional mortgage in favor of the operator that
encumbers non-operating interests. In that same regard, operating lessees should
utilize the provisions of Chapter 9 of Title 10 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes and
file appropriate financing statements to encumber non-operators' interests in
equipment, rigs and proceeds, as applicable 4 5 Operators in Louisiana may not
rely upon provisions in joint operating agreements that purport to create a lien in
favor of the operator since such contractual liens have no legal effect without a
statutory basis." 6
B. Outer Continental Shelf Application
It is unfortunate that use of the phrase "waters of the state" in certain
provisions of the new Act247 has raised speculation that the new Act shall not
apply to the Outer Continental Shelf ("OCS"). In hindsight, it appears that the
phrase "waters of the state" was ill-conceived, especially since the phrase
"offshore" would have been accurate, less confusing, and would apply equally well
to state and federal waters.
The directive of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA"), however,
provides, in pertinent part, that:
the civil laws ... of each adjacent state, now in effect and hereafter
adopted... are declared to be the law of the United States for that portion
of the subsoil and the seabed of the outer Continental Shelf ... which
would be within the area of the state if its boundaries were extended
seaward to the outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf.2 '
Although jurisprudence applying the Louisiana oil and gas well lien statute has
been well and often applied to the OCS,249 the directive was recently reaf-
243. Chicoine. supra note 4, at 21.
244. Id
245. La. R.S. 10:9-402 (1993).
246. Capillon v. Chambliss, 29 So. 2d 171, 176 (La. 1946).
247. La. R.S. 9:4862(A)(2), (5). (6)(c) (Supp. 1997).
248. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(a) (1994).
249. See supra note 103.
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firmed and recited in Gardes Direction Drilling v. U.S. Turnkey Exploration,
Inc.' Gardes clearly states that "the Louisiana oil, gas and water well lien
act [is incorporated] as surrogate federal law under OCSLA."25' Even without
this well-established body of case law, however, the Louisiana legislature has no
legal authority to legislate federal law and, thus, cannot remove the new Act's
application to the OCS in those instances where Louisiana law clearly applies as
the "surrogate" law under the OCSLA. Regardless, it is hoped that later
amendments to the new Act will remove this apparent ambiguity.
C. Opportunity for Remote Furnishers to Benefit From the Act
Although it was the drafters' intent to keep the privilege as close to the well
site as possible,z2 it appears the privilege granted in Section 9:4862(A)(2) may
conflict with the "well site" limitation by allowing the privilege to a "contractor
... for providing services or facilities to persons performing labor or services
on a well site."' 3 Since the definition of "contractor" could include a series
of subcontractors," it may be possible for a person quite distant from the well
site location-who may have no knowledge of the fact that his materials or
services are benefiting the well site-to enjoy the privilege. However, this result
would not be inconsistent with some prior law; 253 further, those who do not
qualify as "subcontractors" would be excluded."z6
It seems unlikely that this potential problem can ever be completely resolved
since the instance where a remote subcontractor might benefit from the privilege
would be very fact specific. Nonetheless, it may be possible for the courts to
draw a "gray line" over which remote subcontractors will not be allowed to pass
if, at the time they provide services and materials, they have no expectation that
their materials or services will benefit an operating interest.
D. Imprescriptibility of Privilege Between Those in Privity
The fact that the new Act provides for extinguishment of the privilege only
as to "a third person" (unless extinguished through extinction or written
consent)," creates a virtually imprescriptible privilege as to persons that are
250. 899 F. Supp. 287 (W.D. La. 1995), reversed on other grounds, 98 F.3d 860 (5th Cir. 1996).
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit expressly agreed with the district court's appliction of Louisiana lien law
in the OCS. 98 F.3d at 864.
251. 899 F. Supp. at 289.
252. Chicoine, supra note 4, at 3.
253. La. R.S. 9:4862(A)(2) (Supp. 1997).
254. La. R.S. 9:4861(10) (Supp. 1997).
255. P.H.A.C. Sere., Inc. v. Seaways Int'l, Inc., 403 So. 2d 1199 (La. 1981).
256. E.g., C.F. Dahlberg & Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 836 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1988).
257. La. R.S. 9:4864(A), (B) (Supp. 1997).
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not third persons, meaning those who are "contractually bound to the claimant
... or who... expressly assumed the obligation."25s
Clearly, Louisiana law provides that an action or right will prescribe only
as mandated by the Louisiana Legislature; if no prescription is established by
legislation, an action or right shall be imprescriptible.259 In fact, there are
many rights and actions in Louisiana that, due to prescription not having been
defined by the legislature, remain imprescriptible.' Further, it has been
recognized that the status of prescription may be modified from time to time by
the legislature and is not a vested or constitutionally protected fundamental
right.2
t
Given the express attention to extinguishment as to a "third person" only,
it is clear that the status of the privilege under the new Act as an imprescriptible
right between contracting persons was intentional. The prior statute contained
no such limitation and provided that the privilege would be extinguished in its
entirety if not preserved by a timely filing of the statement of privilege and,
subsequently, by instituting an action within one year after recording such
notice.26 This result could have been repeated under the new Act, but was
not.
This particular aspect of the new Act (i.e., its imprescriptible nature between
contracting parties) really is not a "problem" except to the obligor under an
applicable contract. Since the privilege would be imprescriptible to such person,
the claimant would have the continuing right to enforce the privilege even
beyond the one-year time period set forth in the new Act, 63 as well as a
continuing right to seek enforcement via a writ or writs of sequestration and
seize affected property as allowed therein. 264
Since the rights of third persons are protected by the specific extinguishment
provisions of the new Act, there should be no adverse public policy consequenc-
es as a result of the imprescriptible nature of the privilege established between
the contracting parties.
258. La. R.S. 9:4861(!1) (Supp. 1997).
259. La. Civ. Code art. 3457.
260. Kaplan v. University Lake Corp., 381 So. 2d 385, 390 (La. 1980) (acknowledging that the
hand note used in Louisiana collateral mortgages is an imprescriptible evidence of indebtedness);
Harang v. Golden Ranch Land & Drainage Co., 143 La. 982, 1016, 79 So. 768, 786 (La. 1918)
(acknowledging that some actions are imprescriptible); Flowers, Inc. v. Rausch. Clerk of Court, 354
So. 2d 641, 643 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1977) (recognizing that tax assessments, once final, become
imprescriptible between the state and tax debtor).
261. Anadarko Prod. Co. v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 455 So. 2d 699, 700 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1984).
262. La. R.S. 9:4865 (1991); Hawn Tool Co. v. Crystal Oil Co., 514 So. 2d 636, 638 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1987); Genina Marine Serv., Inc. v. ARCO Oil & Gas Co., 499 So. 2d 257. 260-61 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1986).
263. La. R.S. 9:4865(B) (Supp. 1997).
264. La. R.S. 9:4871 (Supp. 1997).
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E. Effective Date of New Act
Since the new Act states no specific effective date, the new law took effect
on August 15, 1995, by operation of law. 65 As with any change in the law,
there will be a transitional period during which the courts will continue to apply
prior law to interpretation of privileges.266 Given the extensive changes in the
lien statute and the application of the privilege, it is unlikely that the courts will
view the new Act as merely remedial in all respects; thus, it seems doubtful the
statute will be applied retroactively in every instance.
267
In theory, privileges established before August 15, 1995, could continue for
an indefinite period of time without being subject to the new Act, since a
privilege is established upon the date of first provision of services or materials
and survives, even under the prior statute, without need of filing so long as
materials and services continue to be provided to the well or wells.268
Obviously, those privileges established subsequent to the effective date of
the new Act will be covered thereby. Further, since preservation of the privilege
as to third persons is essentially the same as under the prior statute, it should be
possible for claimants and courts to give effect, generally, to the provisions of
the new Act for those privileges established prior to August 15, 1995, but for
which the ultimate filing date requirement, or the date by which a claimant must
institute an action to enforce the privilege, falls after such effective date (and,
since there are differences between past and current law as to the property
attached, provided the claimant has not filed the statement of privilege or
instituted an enforcement action before August 15, 1995).
A reasonable expectation as to when the courts might apply the new Act is,
perhaps, as follows: for privileges both established and preserved by proper and
timely recordation before August 15, 1995, the prior statute will apply.
Additionally, for privileges established, preserved by proper and timely filing,
and for which enforcement has been sought by institution of an appropriate
action before August 15, 1995, the prior statute will apply.
For privileges established before August 15, 1995, but for which materials
and/or services continue(d) to be provided subsequent to that date, and for which
a statement of privilege has not yet been filed (and provided such privilege was
not extinguished under the provisions of the prior statute prior to August 15,
265. La. Const. art. 11I, § 19 (laws passed during the regular session of the Louisiana Legislature
shall take effect on August 15 of that year).
266. E.g., Gardes Directional Drilling v. U.S. Turnkey Exploration, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 287 (W.D.
La. 1995); Hawn Tool Co. v. Crystal Oil Co., 514 So. 2d 636 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
267. Hawn Tool Co., 514 So. 2d at 639.
268. La. R.S. 9:4862(B) (1991). In fact, with regard to the narrow area of continuous provision
to the well site, claimants and courts may regard the new Act as remedial in nature to help define
what constitutes the continued provision of services and materials to the well site. The new Act
states that a lapse of ninety (90) days or more in the provision of materials or services to the well
site will cause a new privilege to be created. La. R.S. 9:4864(C) (Supp. 1997).
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1995), the prior statute shall control with respect to determining the persons
entitled to such privilege; while the new Act, subject to an appropriate grace
period, shall control as to determining the property subject to the privilege and
for all other purposes. This result might preclude certain claimants under the
prior statute from being able to attach any property due to distinctions between
the prior statute and the new Act.' In particular, persons who may have been
able to attach drilling or other rigs pursuant to the Ogden cases270 would be
precluded under the new Act from attaching rigs not "owned by the operator or
by a contractor from whom the activities giving rise to the privilege ema-
nate."27m Nonetheless, claimants wishing to take advantage of the prior act in
that respect, assuming they had adequate notice of the effective date of the new
Act, would still have the opportunity to file their statement of privilege before
the effective date.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, some appropriate "grace" period should be
respected by the courts to insure that those affected by the new Act have been
allowed a reasonable time to be properly informed of its existence. January 1,
1996, is an attractive date for that purpose, both from the standpoint of providing
over four months notice to potential claimants and the clarity of dealing with a
new calendar year. Of course, equity may justify variances from any rule
depending upon the distinct circumstances of the parties involved.272
IV. CONCLUSION
The new Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act takes great strides in recognizing
practical considerations of today's oil and gas industry, but not all problems
associated with the prior statute have been solved. Undoubtedly, new problems
have been inadvertently and unintentionally created; certainly, the scope and
extent of those problems will be determined over time as the new Act is tested
in the courts. Regardless, the revised Act represents a significant improvement
over the prior statute. Despite its limitations, the new Act is modem in scope
and content in its attempt to deal with difficult and complex questions that have
arisen with regard to the rights of lien claimants and the liability of those against
whom such liens have been asserted.
269. Compare La. R.S. 9:4861 (1991) with La. R.S. 9:4863 (Supp. 1997).
270. Ogden Oil Co. v. Servco, 611 F. Sup. 572 (M.D. La. 1985); Ogden Oil Co. v. Venture Oil
Corp., 490 So. 2d 725 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 494 So. 2d 328 (1986).
271. La. R.S. 9:4863(A)(2) (Supp. 1997).
272. La. Civ. Code art. 4. See Goldking Properties Co. v. Primeaux, 477 So. 2d 76, 78 (La.
1985); Edmonston v. A-Second Mortgage Co. of Slidell. Inc., 289 So. 2d 116, 120 (La. 1974).
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